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Anomaly Discovery and Arbitrage Trading
Abstract
Our model of anomaly discovery has implications for both asset prices and arbitrageurs’ trading.
Consistent with existing evidence, the discovery of an anomaly reduces its magnitude. Our evi-
dence based on 99 anomalies is consistent with new predictions that the discovery of an anomaly
reduces the correlation between the returns its deciles 1 and 10, leading to diversification benefits
for passive investors. These effects become linked to the aggregate trading of hedge funds only
after discovery. Hedge funds increase (reverse) their positions in exploiting anomalies when their
aggregate wealth increases (decreases), further suggesting that these discovery effects operate
through arbitrage trading.
Keywords: Anomaly, Arbitrage, Discovery, Arbitrageur-based asset pricing.
JEL Classifications: G11, G23.
1 Introduction
A significant portion of the asset-pricing literature has been devoted to “anomalies,” empirical
patterns that appear inconsistent with existing benchmark models. One approach to interpreting
anomalies is risk-based. Consider the value premium as an example. It is first documented by
Basu (1983). Since then, numerous models have been proposed to explain why value stocks are
riskier (than what CAPM implies) and so should have higher expected returns.
This approach abstracts away from the discovery aspect. That is, investors in those models
know that value stocks are riskier and demand higher returns. As expected by those investors,
higher average returns are realized for value stocks in the data. In this view, there is no real
discovery: Professor Basu was the last one in the world to find out about the value premium.
Investors knew about this return pattern all along. Essentially, in this view, the amount of capital
that responds to Basu’s findings is too small to meaningfully alter asset prices.
In contrast to the view above, it seems natural to expect discoveries to have significant effects
on investors’ decisions and asset prices, as discoveries in academia have had increasingly important
influences on the asset management industry, especially since the rise of the hedge fund industry
in the 1990s. Many prominent asset management companies regularly organize academic semi-
nars and conferences. Some explicitly claim that they identify investment ideas from academic
research.1 Hence, in this paper, we focus on the discovery aspect by analyzing a stylized model of
anomaly discovery and testing its new predictions empirically. The goal of the model is to have a
simple framework to analyze the effects of anomaly discovery and provide guidance for designing
our empirical tests.
We first consider a model of “risk-based” anomaly. There are two assets (asset 1 and asset 2)
that have the same distribution of future cash flows. However, investors find asset 1 riskier because
their endowment is correlated with asset 1’s cash flow, but not with asset 2’s. Consequently, in
equilibrium, asset 1 has a lower price and a higher expected future return than asset 2. We
call this return pattern “a risk-based anomaly” in the sense that it is caused by investors’ risk
consideration. When this anomaly is discovered, some agents, who we call “arbitrageurs,” become
aware of the return pattern. Importantly, arbitrageurs find the return pattern worth exploiting,
perhaps because they have a different labor income profile and do not face the endowment risk
that investors do.
1Take Dimensional Fund Advisors as an example. According to its website, as of June 30, 2014, it manages
$378 billion. Academic research appears to have a deep influence on its operation, as its website states: “Working
closely with leading financial academics, we identify new ideas that may benefit investors.”
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To analyze the discovery effect, we construct an equilibrium without these arbitrageurs, which
we call the “pre-discovery equilibrium,” and an equilibrium with these arbitrageurs, which we call
the “post-discovery equilibrium.” The discovery effect is captured by the difference between the
pre- and post-discovery equilibria.
The notion of “risk-based” in our stylized model is different from that in traditional models.
But that is the point. Traditional models abstract away from discovery and all investors know
the return patterns and do not respond to the “discovery of the anomaly.” In our formulation,
however, arbitrageurs become aware of the anomaly and find it worth exploiting. As pointed out
in Cochrane (1999), this discovery aspect “is (so far) the least stressed in academic analysis. In
my opinion, it may end up being the most important.” Moreover, the traditional formulation can
be viewed as a special case in our model, where no arbitrageurs find the anomaly worth exploiting.
Our model has two sets of implications on asset prices, as well as associated implications on
arbitrageurs’ trading. First, after the discovery of an anomaly, its return (i.e., the return from a
long position in asset 1 and a short position in asset 2) decreases and becomes more correlated with
the returns from other existing anomalies. The result that the discovery of an anomaly reduces
its magnitude follows directly once we recognize that the discovery brings in arbitrageurs. Let us
use the value premium as an example. It has been proposed that value stocks are riskier because
they are more exposed to the business cycle. Arbitrageurs, however, may not be as concerned
about this risk and choose to exploit this anomaly and consequently reduce its magnitude.2
The correlation with other anomalies is due to a wealth effect when arbitrageurs exploit both
existing anomalies and the newly discovered one. Suppose the return from existing anomalies is
unexpectedly high one period, thus increasing arbitrageurs’ wealth. Everything else being equal,
arbitrageurs will allocate more investment to all their opportunities, including the new anomaly.
This higher investment pushes up the price of asset 1 and pushes down the price of asset 2, leading
to a high return from the new anomaly. Similarly, a low return from existing anomalies leads to
a low return from the newly discovered one. Hence, the wealth effect increases the correlation
between the new anomaly return and the returns from existing anomalies.
Second, the discovery reduces the correlation between the returns of assets 1 and 2, and
this effect is stronger when arbitrageurs’ wealth is more volatile. This is because arbitrageurs
increase (reverse) their positions in exploiting the anomaly when their wealth increases (decreases).
2For example, in an article written by several senior managers at AQR, Asness, Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz
(2014) state that “[w]e are fans of both momentum and value...” They also state that “none of this debate [about
whether momentum is due to risk or mispricing] should diminish momentum as a valuable investment tool.”
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Specifically, after the discovery, arbitrageurs have a long-short position in assets 1 and 2, as well
as investments in other opportunities. Suppose the arbitrageurs’ wealth increases due to, say, a
high return from their investments or fund flows from their investors. They will buy asset 1 and
sell asset 2. This increases asset 1’s return but decreases asset 2’s. Similarly, when arbitrageurs’
wealth decreases, they will unwind some of their long-short positions, i.e., sell asset 1 and buy
asset 2, which decreases asset 1’s return but increases asset 2’s. In both cases, arbitrageurs’
wealth shocks push the returns of the two assets to opposite directions, reducing their correlation.
This intuition also suggests that the effect is stronger when arbitrageurs’ wealth is more volatile.
Since the correlation between assets 1 and 2 is reduced, a natural implication is that, ceteris
paribus, the volatility of holding both assets 1 and 2, i.e., the market portfolio, is reduced,
leading a diversification benefit for passive investors. This diversification benefit is stronger when
arbitrageurs’ wealth volatility is higher.
We also analyze a version of our model where the anomaly is due to “mispricing.” Specifically,
we modify the previous model so that investors do not have the hedging need in asset 1, but
mistakenly believe that asset 1’s future cash flow is lower than asset 2’s. Our analysis shows
that the discovery of this mispricing-based anomaly has the same two sets of predictions on
asset prices, as well as arbitrageurs’ trading activities. The first set of implications on prices are
consistent with existing empirical evidence. For example, McLean and Pontiff (2016) analyze the
post-discovery performance of 97 anomalies, and find that after the discovery of an anomaly, it
returns decay by 58% on average, and become more correlated with the returns from existing
anomalies.
The second set of implications on asset prices are new to the literature. We empirically
examine them, as well as their implied arbitrage trading activities. Our tests are based on a
comprehensive set of 99 anomalies, which are constructed using widely-accessible public data. We
first test whether the correlation between deciles 1 (the long leg) and 10 (the short leg) of an
anomaly decreases after the discovery of the anomaly. For each anomaly, we use a 5-year rolling
window to estimate the correlation coefficient between the monthly excess returns of deciles 1
and 10 during 1963–2015. To control for its potential time trend, our analysis focuses on excess
correlation: the correlation between deciles 1 and 10 minus the correlation between deciles 5 and
6. The idea is that arbitrageurs are likely to take larger long-short positions in deciles 1 and 10
than in deciles 5 and 6. Hence, the correlation between deciles 5 and 6 should have little discovery
effect, but should share the common time trend with the correlation between deciles 1 and 10.
For each anomaly, we construct a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 before the “discov-
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ery” of the anomaly and 1 afterwards. We use the publication time of the paper that documented
the anomaly (or latest working paper dates for unpublished papers) as a proxy for the discovery
time. We pool the anomalies together, and run a panel regression of the excess correlation on the
discovery dummy. The coefficient for the dummy variable is −0.05 (t = −6.39), implying that,
on average, the discovery of an anomaly reduces the correlation by 5%.
Our evidence shows that there is a link between the excess correlation and the aggregate hedge
funds’ activity, further supporting the view that the discovery effect operates through arbitrage
trading. Our model implies that after the discovery of an anomaly, the correlation between deciles
1 and 10 becomes more negatively correlated with the volatility of arbitrageurs’ wealth.3 Since
we cannot directly measure the aggregate wealth of all arbitrageurs, we use the aggregate hedge
fund asset under management as a proxy. We run a panel regression of the excess correlation on
the interaction term of the discovery dummy and the hedge fund wealth volatility. Our model
implies that the hedge fund wealth volatility reduces the correlation between deciles 1 and 10 after
the discovery, and hence that the coefficient for the interaction term should be negative. This is
indeed the case. The coefficient for the interaction term is −0.05, with a t-statistic of −2.37.
Our interpretation suggests that the discovery effect should be stronger if the discovery attracts
more attention. To test this implication, we use the Google citation count of the original study
that discoveries an anomaly as a proxy of the attention to the anomaly. Highly-cited anomalies by
both academic and practitioner journals are likely to be the anomalies with persistent profitability
and tradability, thus attracting more arbitrage trading. We run a citation-weighted least square
regression, which assigns higher weight to anomalies with higher citation counts. Consistent with
the implication, the above two effects become significantly stronger once we weight anomalies by
their citation counts. The coefficient for the discovery dummy is 0.09, with a t-statistic of −9.11.
The coefficient for the interaction term is −0.13, with a t-statistic of −3.00.
These post-discovery correlation changes are large. For example, the post-discovery correlation
reduction represents 36% and 64% of the standard deviation of the correlation coefficient when
anomalies are equal-weighted and citation-weighted, respectively.
To further assess the economic significance of this reduction in correlation, we examine its
diversification benefit: the reduction of the correlation coefficient between deciles 1 and 10 reduces
the volatility of holding the aggregate portfolio of deciles 1 and 10. To see this, we examine the
3This prediction is the opposite of the implication from the common intuition that arbitrageurs’ wealth tends to
be more volatile when the market is more volatile (e.g., in a financial crisis). Since stocks tend to be more correlated
when the market is more volatile, this intuition implies that the correlation between deciles 1 and 10 should be
increasing in the volatility of arbitrageurs’ wealth.
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volatility of the equal weighted portfolio deciles 1 and 10 in excess of the market volatility. We
find that, on the equal (citation) weight basis, the discovery of an anomaly reduces this volatility
by 21% (61%) of its pre-discovery level. Since the set of stocks in deciles 1 and 10 of an anomaly
change over time, the diversification benefits are effectively shared by investors who hold the
market portfolio. That is, arbitrageurs’ trading provides a diversification benefit for passive
investors who hold the market portfolio. Our evidence further shows that this effect is stronger
when arbitrageurs’ wealth volatility is higher.
Finally, we directly examine the two model implications on arbitrage trading. First, we exam-
ine whether hedge funds trade more in the direction of exploiting an anomaly (i.e., buy decile 1
and sell decile 10) after its discovery. Second, we test whether, after the discovery of an anomaly,
hedge funds increase their positions in exploiting the anomaly when their wealth increases, and
reverses their positions when their wealth decreases.
We construct two alternative arbitrage trading measures. Our main measure is based on the
changes in the aggregate hedge fund holdings. We identify hedge funds in the 13F institutional
holdings filings. For each anomaly, we compute the aggregate hedge fund position changes in
decile 1 and in decile 10. We use the difference between the two position changes as a proxy
for arbitrageurs’ trading on the anomaly. A positive (negative) value means that hedge funds
are trading in the “right” (“wrong”) direction of exploiting the anomaly. The other measure is
similarly defined based on the difference between the short interest changes of the two deciles.
Consistent with our model predictions, the regression results based on both measures suggest
that an anomaly discovery leads to an increase in arbitrage trading in the direction of exploiting the
anomaly. The magnitude of such increase is between 2% and 7% of the total shares outstanding of
the average stocks traded in the two deciles. Moreover, the aggregate arbitrage positions increase
(decrease) when the aggregate asset under management of hedge funds increase (decrease). A one
standard deviation post-discovery increase (decrease) in the aggregate asset under management
by hedge funds leads to an increase (decrease) in arbitrage trading that exploit the anomaly by
between 2% and 7% of the total shares outstanding. As expected, the results are stronger when
anomalies are citation-weighted in the estimation.
On the theoretical front, our paper is closely related to the analyses of arbitrageurs’ risk-
bearing capacity (e.g., Dow and Gorton (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Xiong (2001), and
Kyle and Xiong (2001)). More broadly, our paper belongs to the literature that explores the role
of arbitrageurs in asset pricing (e.g., Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Liu and Longstaff (2004), Basak
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and Croitoru (2006), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Kondor (2009), He and Krishnamurthy
(2013), Lou and Polk (2013), Kondor and Vayanos (2013), Hanson and Sunderam (2014), Chinco
(2014), Drechsler and Drechsler (2014), and Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012, 2014), and Kozak,
Nagel, and Santosh (2018)). These studies focus on the impact of arbitrageurs in contagion, risk
sharing, liquidity, portfolio choice, limit of arbitrage, the relation between the cost of shorting and
anomaly returns, and so on, while our paper shed light on the effect of discovery by arbitrageurs.
Cho (2018) highlights the role of arbitrage activity in determining the cross-section of betas.
Our paper is also related to the large literature on comovement. Existing studies demon-
strate that comovement appear excessively high relative to fundamentals due to behavioral or
friction-based reasons, when arbitrage is limited (e.g., Shiller (1989), Karolyi and Stulz (1996),
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyan (2001), Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Barberis, Shleifer,
and Wurgler (2005), Peng and Xiong (2006), Green and Hwang (2009), Bartram, Griffin, Lim,
Ng (2015), Da and Shive (2016)). We instead demonstrate that commovement can be excessively
low among certain assets due to arbitrage trading. This complements prior studies such as Kyle
and Xiong (2001), which shows that arbitrageurs can induce excessively high comovements among
assets especially during periods of high volatility.
There is an extensive literature on anomalies, exploring explanations that are consumption-
based (e.g., Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005)), investment-based (e.g., Hou, Xue, Zhang
(2014)), institution-based (e.g., Vayanos and Woolley (2013)), and behavioral-based (e.g., Baker
and Wurgler (2006)). See Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) for a comprehensive list. While these
explanations generally abstract away from the discovery aspect, we take it seriously and formally
analyze its consequences.
Finally, our paper adds to the recent growing interest in meta analysis on the systematic
patterns of a large number of anomalies (e.g., Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), Harvey, Liu, and
Zhu (2016), McLean and Pontiff (2016), Green, Hand and Zhang (2017, GHZ), Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2017), Yan and Zheng (2017), Dong, Feng, and Sadka (2017)).
The rest of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 presents a model of risk-based anomaly, Section
3 analyzes a mispricing-based anomaly. Empirical analysis is reported in Section 4, and Section
5 concludes. The numerical algorithm and proofs are in the appendix.
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2 A model of the discovery of a risk-based anomaly
Consider a two-period model, with time t = 0, 1, 2. Trading takes place at t = 0, 1, and consump-
tion occurs at t = 2. There is one risk-free asset, and its interest rate is normalized to 0. There
are two risky assets, asset 1 and asset 2, each of which is a claim to a single cash flow at t = 2.
There is a continuum of identical investors, with a population size of one. At t = 0, investors are
endowed with one unit of each asset and k dollars cash.
Asset i, for i = 1, 2, is a claim to a cash flow Di at time t = 2. Moreover, D1 and D2 are
independent from each other and have the same ex ante distribution at t = 0. Specifically, for
i = 1, 2, we have
Di = µi,1 × µi,2, (1)
where µi,1 and µi,2 are random variables that will be realized at time t = 1 and t = 2, respectively.
Moreover, µi,t , for i = 1, 2 and t = 1, 2, are independent across i and t, and have the same binary
distribution:
µi,t =
{
µ+ σ with probability p,
µ− σ with probability 1− p,
(2)
where µ > σ > 0, and 0 < p < 1.
For i = 1, 2, and t = 0, 1, 2, we use Pi,t to denote the price of asset i at time t, which will be
determined endogenously in equilibrium. At t = 2, asset prices are pinned down by the final cash
flow: Pi,2 = Di. We denote the gross return of asset i at time t, for t = 1, 2, as
ri,t ≡
Pi,t
Pi,t−1
.
2.1 Hedging demand
Investors are endowed with a nontradable asset (e.g., labor income), which is a claim to a cash
flow ρD1 at t = 2, with ρ ≥ 0. That is, this endowment is perfectly correlated with the payoff
from asset 1. Denote investors’ wealth, excluding their nontradable endowment, at time t as Wt
for t = 0, 1, 2. If investors allocate a fraction θi,t of Wt to asset i at time t, for i = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1,
their wealth dynamic is given by
Wt+1 = Wt

 ∑
i∈{1,2}
θi,tri,t+1 +

1− ∑
i∈{1,2}
θi,t



 , (3)
with W0 = k + P1,0 + P2,0. Investors’ objective is to choose θi,t, for i = 1, 2, and t = 0, 1, to
max
θi,t
E0 [log (W2 + ρD1)] , (4)
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subject to (3). Investors find asset 1 riskier because its return is correlated with their endowment.
As we will see later, due to this hedging demand, asset 1 has a lower price and a higher expected
return in equilibrium. We will label this return pattern as an “anomaly,” because when an
econometrician observes the return data alone, he would not be able to explain it by CAPM.
We, of course, do not take this formulation literally. Instead, the above formulation is meant to
capture the essence of risk-based anomalies in a reduced form, i.e., asset 1 has low returns during
“bad times.”
2.2 Arbitrageurs
Traditional risk-based explanations of anomalies abstract away from the discovery aspect. Let
us use the value premium as an example. By definition, the “discovery” of the value premium
in Basu (1983) should make at least some market participants aware of the return pattern for
the first time, unless one believes Basu was actually the last person to find out about the return
pattern. In traditional risk-based models of the value premium, however, all investors knew about
the value premium even before the discovery in Basu (1983). That is, this traditional approach
does not take into account the effect of discovery, which is exactly the focus of our paper. That
is, we analyze the fact that the discovery of the anomaly informs some agents about the return
pattern for the first time. For convenience, we call those agents “arbitrageurs” to highlight that
their risk exposure is different from that of the previously-described “investors.”
Specifically, there is a continuum of identical arbitrageurs, with a population size of one.
Their aggregate endowment at t = 0 is W a0 ≥ 0 dollars in cash. Importantly, they do not have
the hedging demand that investors have, perhaps because arbitrageurs have a different labor
income profile. To analyze the discovery effect across anomalies, we assume that arbitrageurs
have access to another investment opportunity, which presumably exploits existing anomalies
(say, e.g., currency carry trade). This opportunity is not available to the investors described
earlier, perhaps because those investors do not have the expertise to analyze and implement the
strategy. We call this existing anomaly “asset e,” and assume its gross return at t = 1, 2 is
re,t =
{
µe + σe, with probability pe,
µe − σe, with probability 1− pe,
where µe > σe > 0, and 0 < pe < 1. Moreover, re,t is assumed to be independent from µi,t. That
is, the fundamentals of assets 1 and 2 are independent from the existing anomaly—asset e.
For simplicity, we assume that the return of the existing anomaly re,t is exogenously given.
This simplification shuts down the effect of the discovery on the returns of existing anomalies.
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This effect, however, is going to be small if the amount of the capital attracted by this new
anomaly is small relative to the aggregate arbitrage capital attracted by all existing anomalies.4
2.3 Discovery effect
To analyze the discovery effect, we compare the equilibria across the following two economies. In
the first (pre-discovery) economy, arbitrageurs are not aware of the anomaly (i.e., that assets 1
and 2 have the same fundamentals but different prices at t = 0). Hence, they invest in asset e, but
not in assets 1 or 2. In the second (post-discovery) economy, arbitrageurs become aware of the
anomaly and start exploiting it, as well as investing in the existing anomaly—asset e. To capture
this, we assume that arbitrageurs take a long-short strategy in the two assets so that they can
exploit the anomaly and stay “market neutral.”5 Specifically, we use θai,t to denote the fraction of
arbitrageurs’ wealth that is invested in asset i = 1, 2, at time t = 0, 1. A market-neutral strategy
is such that, for t = 0, 1,
θa1,t + θ
a
2,t = 0. (5)
Let us use θae,t to denote the fraction of arbitrageurs’ wealth that is invested in asset e at time
t = 0, 1. Then, arbitrageurs’ wealth dynamic is given by
W at+1 = W
a
t

 ∑
i∈{1,2,e}
θai,tri,t+1 +

1− ∑
i∈{1,2,e}
θai,t



 , (6)
for t = 0, 1. Their objective is to choose θai,t for i = 1, 2, e, and t = 0, 1, to
max
θa
i,t
E0 [log (W
a
2 )] , (7)
subject to (5) and (6).
In the pre-discovery economy, arbitrageurs are on the sidelines and have no impact on the
markets for assets 1 and 2.6 Hence, the equilibrium can be defined as follows. The pre-discovery
4Of course, our simplification may miss some subtle dynamics. For example, one might conjecture that investors
may substitute between major anomalies, and generate negative correlation among them. Asness, Moskowitz, and
Pedersen (2013) document a negative correlation between value and momentum returns. These specific dynamics
are beyond the scope of this paper.
5This assumption is made so that arbitrageurs focus on exploiting the anomaly. Alternatively, we can simply
assume that after the discovery, arbitrageurs become aware of the existence of assets 1 and 2. Under this alternative
assumption, however, arbitrageurs will not only take a long-short position in the two assets, but also start investing
in both assets. The latter will simply push up the prices of both assets. We are not interested in analyzing this
latter effect. Moreover, in the value premium example, for instance, it seems more natural to think that, after the
discovery of the value premium, hedge funds start buying value stocks and shorting growth stocks, rather than
hedge funds becoming aware of the existence of both value and growth stocks and starting to buy both of them.
6This assumption perhaps resembles the preference of hedge funds, who attempt to deliver market neutral
returns, and so have little interest in assets 1 and 2 before the discovery. Another reason is that hedge funds may
choose to self-impose restrictions on their investment opportunity set (He and Xiong (2013)).
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competitive equilibrium is defined as asset prices (Pi,t for i = 1, 2, and t = 0, 1) and investors’
portfolios (θi,t for t = 0, 1 and i = 1, 2), such that investors’ portfolios optimize (4), and markets
clear, i.e., for i = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1,
Wtθi,t = Pi,t. (8)
Similarly, the post-discovery competitive equilibrium is defined as asset prices (Pi,t for i = 1, 2,
and t = 0, 1) and portfolios of investors and arbitrageurs (θi,t for t = 0, 1 and i = 1, 2; and θ
a
i,t for
t = 0, 1, i = 1, 2, e), such that investors’ portfolios optimize (4), arbitrageurs’ portfolios optimize
(7), and markets clear, i.e., for i = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1,
Wtθi,t +W
a
t θ
a
i,t = Pi,t. (9)
The implicit assumption is that arbitrageurs do not have any hedging demand in asset 1 or
2. Moreover, after the discovery, they know that the cause of the anomaly is investors’ hedging
demand. These are simplifying assumptions. What is necessary is that arbitrageurs have less
hedging demand in asset 1 than investors. Finally, even if arbitrageurs do not know the true
cause of the anomaly, they will still invest in it, and the main implications in this alternative
model remain similar to those in our current setup.7
2.4 Equilibrium
Proposition 1 (Pre-discovery) The pre-discovery equilibrium prices Pi,t and portfolio choices
θi,t can be characterized by equation (8) and
Et
[
ri,t+1 − 1
Wt+1 + ρP1,t+1
]
= 0, for i = 1, 2, t = 0, 1. (10)
Moreover, in this equilibrium, we have P1,0 < P2,0.
The above proposition illustrates the anomaly: Although both assets have the same funda-
mentals ex ante, they have different prices and hence different future expected returns. Due to
their endowment, investors find asset 1 more risky than asset 2, leading to a lower price for asset
1. We label this as an anomaly because if an econometrician had only the price data, he would
find the return pattern puzzling. This is similar to the anomalies we see in the literature. For
example, the value premium is a puzzle if one looks at the return data alone. Risk-based models
try to explore the idea that value stocks have a higher exposure to certain risk factors, which is
7See Brennan and Xia (2001) for an analysis of this intuition in the portfolio choice context.
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similar to the reduced-formulation of the hedging demand in our model. While traditional risk-
based models focus on the detailed analysis of the exact mechanism through which the hedging
demand arises, they assume away the discovery aspect since all investors know the return pattern
all along. In contrast, we are not interested in the details of the hedging demand, but focus on
the analysis of the consequences of the discovery.
The following proposition characterizes the post-discovery equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Post-discovery) The post-discovery equilibrium prices Pi,t and portfolio choices
θi,t and θ
a
i,1 can be characterized by equations (5), (9), (10), and for t = 0, 1,
Et
[
r1,t+1 − r2,t+1
W at+1
]
= 0,
Et
[
re,t+1 − 1
W at+1
]
= 0.
Since arbitrageurs are not exposed to the endowment risk that investors have, they find the
anomaly an attractive investment opportunity, and buy asset 1 and short asset 2. For convenience,
we call the return from this long-short portfolio, r1,1 − r2,1, the “anomaly return.”
To analyze the discovery effect, we will compare the post-discovery equilibrium in Proposition
2 with the pre-discovery equilibrium in Proposition 1.8 In particular, following the algorithm in
Appendix A, we solve both equilibria numerically. The baseline parameter values are summarized
in Table 1. In the following numerical analysis, we vary only one parameter at a time to examine
the effects of the discovery. We have also repeated our numerical analyses for other parameter
values, and none of the following qualitative results are specific to the chosen parameters.
2.5 Anomaly magnitude
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of discovery on the expected anomaly returns. The dashed line
represents the size of the anomaly (i.e., the expected anomaly return E0[r1,1 − r2,1]) before the
discovery. Since arbitrageurs have no influence on the markets for assets 1 and 2 before the
discovery, the dashed line is flat: The expected anomaly return is around 5.5% regardless of
8The equation system in Proposition 2 is highly nonlinear and we have not been able to establish the existence
and uniqueness of their solutions. However, we have always been able to solve the equation system numerically,
and the solution appears to be unique. One might be somewhat surprised that the simple two-period structure in
our model does not allow for a closed-form solution. In fact, the wealth effect in our model has similar complexity
as that in the continuous-time model in Xiong (2001), which also heavily relies on numerical analysis. As noted in
Gromb and Vayanos (2002), a two-period model of arbitrageurs and investors with a wealth effect is not as tractable
as its appearance suggests (page 381). In a recent study, Kondor and Vayanos (2013) gain more tractability by
simplifying investors’ decisions.
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arbitrageurs’ wealth.
After the discovery, arbitrageurs start exploiting the opportunity, reducing the expected
anomaly return. As shown by the solid line in Panel A, the post-discovery expected anomaly
return is lower than that in the pre-discovery case (i.e., the solid line is below the dashed line).
In the case W a0 = 2, for example, the discovery reduces the expected anomaly return from 5.5%
to 5%.
The plot also shows that the effect of discovery is stronger when arbitrageurs have more
wealth. For example, in the case W a0 = 5, the discovery reduces the expected anomaly return
from 5.5% to 4%. The discovery effect disappears when W a0 = 0. One can think of this W
a
0 = 0
case as representing the traditional modeling approach, where discovery does not change the set
of investors who are aware of the anomaly.
Panels B and C demonstrate the effects of arbitrageurs’ existing investment opportunity (i.e.,
asset e). If arbitrageurs’ existing strategy is more attractive (i.e., µe is higher, or σe is lower),
they will allocate less capital to exploit the new anomaly and so its expected return will drop less.
As shown in Panels B and C, after the discovery of an anomaly, its expected return is increasing
in µe and decreasing in σe.
2.6 Correlation among anomaly returns
By the construction of our model, before the discovery, the anomaly return r1,1−r2,1 is independent
of the return of the existing anomaly re,1. How does the discovery affect the correlation between
r1,1 − r2,1 and re,1?
Intuitively, after the discovery of an anomaly, arbitrageurs start exploiting it, as well as the
existing anomaly, asset e. This creates a correlation through the wealth effect. Suppose the return
from asset e is unexpectedly high one period. This increases the wealth of these arbitrageurs.
Everything else being equal, they will allocate more investment to the newly discovered anomaly.
This higher investment pushes up the price of asset 1 and pushes down the price of asset 2, leading
to a high anomaly return r1,1 − r2,1. Similarly, an unexpectedly low return from asset e leads
to a low anomaly return. That is, the wealth effect increases the correlation between the newly
discovered anomaly return and the return from the existing anomaly.
The above intuition is illustrated in Figure 2. Panel A plots the correlation coefficient between
r1,1− r2,1 and re,1. Before the discovery, as illustrated by the dashed line, the correlation is 0. In
contrast, the post-discovery correlation, shown by the solid line, is positive. The only exception
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is the case W a0 = 0, where the arbitrageurs have no wealth.
This discovery effect (i.e., the change in the correlation across the pre- and post-discovery
cases) is initially increasing in the size of arbitrage capital W a0 , and is not monotonic. This is
because arbitrageurs have two effects on the correlation. The first is the aforementioned wealth
effect, which increases the correlation. The second is that as arbitrage capital increases, the prices
of assets 1 and 2 are more driven by their fundamentals. This reduces the correlation between
r1,1 − r2,1 and re,1. When the size of arbitrage capital is sufficiently large, the second effect
dominates, and hence a further increase in arbitrage capital reduces the correlation.
The above intuition is further illustrated in Panels B and C. In particular, when arbitrageurs
have a larger position in asset e (due to a higher µe or a lower σe), their wealth becomes more
sensitive to its realized return re,1. This leads to a stronger wealth effect, i.e., the discovery has a
stronger effect in generating the correlation between r1,1− r2,1 and re,1. In Panel B, for example,
as the expected return from asset e increases (i.e., a higher µe), it leads to a higher correlation
between r1,1 − r2,1 and re,1. Similarly, in Panel C, as the volatility of asset e increases (i.e., a
higher σe), it leads to a weaker wealth effect and a lower correlation.
2.7 Correlation between assets 1 and 2
Our model shows that the discovery of an anomaly reduces the correlation coefficient between
the returns of assets 1 and 2. The intuition is as follows. After the discovery, arbitrageurs long
asset 1 and short asset 2 to exploit the anomaly. Now, suppose arbitrageurs’ wealth increases
due to, say, a high return from their investment in asset e. They will buy more of asset 1 and
sell more of asset 2. This increases asset 1’s return but decreases asset 2’s return. Similarly,
when arbitrageurs’ wealth decreases, they will unwind some of their positions in the long-short
portfolio. That is, they will sell asset 1 and buy asset 2, decreasing asset 1’s return but increasing
asset 2’s return. In both cases, arbitrageurs’ wealth shocks push the returns of the two assets to
opposite directions, which reduces the correlation between the returns of assets 1 and 2.
This intuition is illustrated in Figure 3. The dashed line in Panel A is for the pre-discovery
correlation between assets 1 and 2. Since arbitrageurs are on the sidelines before the discovery,
their wealth level W a0 does not affect the correlation. Hence, the dashed line is flat. The post-
discovery case is represented by the solid line. It is below the dashed line, suggesting that the
discovery reduces the correlation between assets 1 and 2. It also shows that the larger the size of
arbitrage capital, the larger the reduction in the correlation.
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The above intuition further suggests that the discovery effect is stronger when arbitrageurs’
wealth is more volatile. To illustrate this intuition, we plot the correlation between assets 1 and
2 against arbitrageurs’ wealth volatility, which is an endogenous variable. Specifically, we vary
arbitrageurs’ wealth volatility by changing µe from 1.1 to 1.46.
9 The solid line in Panel B shows
that after the discovery, the correlation between assets 1 and 2 is decreasing in arbitrageurs’
wealth volatility. In contrast, this relation does not hold before the discovery, as shown by the
dashed line.
2.8 Diversification benefits
An economic consequence of the reduction in the correlation between assets 1 and 2 is that
arbitrageurs’ trading leads to diversification benefits for passive investors, who hold the market
portfolio of assets 1 and 2. To see this, we plot the volatility of an equal-weighted portfolio
consisting of assets 1 and 2 in Figure 4. As expected, we find that the portfolio volatility decreases
following the anomaly discovery.
In particular, Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the diversification benefits, i.e., reductions in
market volatility, are stronger when arbitrageurs’ wealth is higher, since the reduction in the
post-discovery correlation between assets 1 and 2 increases with the size of arbitrage capital. By
the same token, the diversification benefits are also stronger when arbitrageurs’ wealth volatility
is higher, as shown in Panel B of Figure 4.
3 Mispricing-based anomaly
We now analyze a model in which the anomaly is caused by investors’ behavioral bias. Specifically,
we modify the previous model by setting ρ = 0; that is, there is no hedging demand. The
fundamentals of the two assets are still given by (1) and (2). However, investors are biased about
asset 1 and believe that for t = 1, 2,
µ1,t =
{
µ+ σ with probability p− b,
µ− σ with probability p+ b,
(11)
where 0 ≤ b < p. That is, investors underestimate asset 1’s expected cash flow, and b measures
the degree of the bias. In contrast, their belief about asset 2 is correct.
9Qualitatively similar results can be generated by varying σe instead.
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Investors’ objective is to choose θi,t, for i = 1, 2, and t = 0, 1, to
max
θi,t
E∗0 [log (W2)] , (12)
subject to (3), where E∗0 [·] indicates that the expectation is taken under the biased belief in (11).
Arbitrageurs have correct beliefs, and their objective is given by (7), as in the previous section.
This formulation is meant to capture the essence of mispricing-based interpretations of anoma-
lies in a reduced form. For instance, in the value premium example, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1994) argue that investors are overly enthusiastic about glamorous growth stocks and
have a low demand for value stocks. Similarly, in our model, investors underestimate the payoff
from asset 1 and so have a low demand.
Similar to the case of the risk-based anomaly, in the pre-discovery case, arbitrageurs have no
influence on the markets for assets 1 and 2. The competitive equilibrium for this case is defined as
asset prices (Pi,t for i = 1, 2, and t = 0, 1) and investors’ portfolios (θi,t for t = 0, 1 and i = 1, 2),
such that investors’ portfolios optimize (12), and markets clear as in (8).
The post-discovery competitive equilibrium is defined as asset prices (Pi,t for i = 1, 2, and
t = 0, 1) and portfolios of investors and arbitrageurs (θi,t for t = 0, 1 and i = 1, 2; and θ
a
i,t for
t = 0, 1, i = 1, 2, e), such that investors’ portfolios optimize (12), arbitrageurs’ portfolios optimize
(7), and markets clear as in (9).
What is implicitly assumed here is that the discovery does not affect investors’ bias b. That
is, the bias is systematic and deeply rooted, and investors do not adjust their behavior after the
discovery of the anomaly. This assumption is made for simplicity. Alternatively, if the bias is
partially reduced after the discovery, the results remain qualitatively similar.
Proposition 3 The pre-discovery equilibrium prices Pi,t and portfolio choices θi,t can be charac-
terized by (8), and for i = 1, 2, t = 0, 1,
E∗t
[
ri,t+1 − 1
Wt+1
]
= 0. (13)
The post-discovery equilibrium prices Pi,t and portfolio choices (θi,t, and θ
a
i,1) can be characterized
by equations (5), (9), (13), and for t = 0, 1,
Et
[
r1,t+1 − r2,t+1
W at+1
]
= 0, (14)
Et
[
re,t+1 − 1
W at+1
]
= 0. (15)
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Similar to the risk-based case in the previous section, investors have a lower demand for asset
1 than for asset 2. The only difference is the motivation. In the risk-based case, the motivation is
to hedge, while in the mispricing-based case, the motivation is investors’ wrong belief. To compare
the post-discovery return dynamic across the risk-based case and the mispricing-based case, we
set b = 0.055 and adopt all other parameters from Table 1. We choose this value for b so that,
before the discovery, the expected anomaly returns are the same across the two cases.
Panel A of Figure 5 shows that the post-discovery performance of a mispricing-based anomaly
is similar to that of a risk-based anomaly. The solid and dashed lines represent the post-discovery
expected anomaly return for the risk- and mispricing-based cases, respectively. The pre-discovery
expected anomaly return for both cases is flat at around 5.5% (we omitted this flat line). The
plot shows that the discovery of an anomaly reduces its expected return regardless of whether the
anomaly is caused by risk or mispricing. Moreover, both lines are downward sloping, implying
that the more arbitrage capital (W a0 ), the stronger the effect. Panel B shows that, for both the
risk- and mispricing-based cases, the discovery of an anomaly increases the correlation between
its return and the existing anomaly return. Even the non-monotonic pattern is similar across
the two cases. Finally, Panel C shows that the discovery of the anomaly reduces the correlation
between assets 1 and 2 for both risk- and mispricing-based cases. Moreover, this correlation is
decreasing in arbitrageurs’ wealth level W a0 in both cases.
As the discovery effect can be similar across risk- and mispricing-based anomalies, in the next
section we will include in our empirical analysis all the anomalies for which data is available,
without worrying about the sources of the anomalies.
4 Empirical Analysis
Our risk-based model in Section 2 and mispricing-based model in Section 3 share the same two
sets of predictions on asset prices. First, the discovery of an anomaly reduces its magnitude and
increases its correlation with existing anomalies. Second, the discovery of an anomaly reduces
the correlation between assets 1 and 2. The first prediction is consistent with existing empirical
evidence (e.g., McLean and Pontiff (2016)). The second prediction is new to the literature, and
we empirically test them in this section. Moreover, the two versions of our models also share their
predictions on arbitrageurs’ trading, which we will also empirically examine in this section.
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4.1 Data
We build our anomaly variables by starting from all the anomaly characteristics listed in Green,
Hand and Zhang (2017, GHZ), which are required to be calculable entirely from the widely
available CRSP, Compustat and/or I/B/E/S data. We focus on the “main-effect signals,” i.e.,
characteristics that are interactions between other characteristics are excluded, to avoid confound-
ing effects. We further require that the anomaly sorting variables are continuous so that decile
portfolios can be formed for calculating our excess correlation measure. As such, dummy variable-
based anomalies are excluded. We then add the anomalies that are not included in GHZ but are
studied in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012). This results in a final list of 99 anomalies.
For each month t’s return we calculate characteristics as they were at the end of month t− 1,
assuming that annual accounting data are available at the end of month t− 1 if the firm’s fiscal
year ended at least six months before the end of month t− 1, and that quarterly accounting data
are available at the end of month t − 1 if the fiscal quarter ended at least four months before
the end of month t− 1. We take monthly stock returns from CRSP and include delisting returns
following Shumway and Warther (1999). Our sample for the monthly anomaly decile portfolio
returns and risk-free asset returns is from 1963 to 2015.
We use the publication date as a proxy for the discovery time. For unpublished anomalies, we
use the date of the latest working paper. It is not obvious how to choose the “discovery time”
for each anomaly. The decision is necessarily subjective to some extent. Suppose we choose the
publication time of the first study on the anomaly. It is possible that practitioners have known
and exploited the anomaly before that. The essence of the “discovery time” in our model is the
time when a large number of arbitrageurs start exploiting the anomaly. One might suspect that
it may take some time after arbitrageurs become aware of an anomaly for them to be convinced
and start exploiting it. Moreover, the first publication might not be the one that generates most
attention. Therefore, for an anomaly that has multiple papers focusing on it as the main effect in
the paper, we choose the publication date of the most cited paper. Hence, one should not take the
literal interpretation that those anomalies were secrets before the publication time and became
public information afterwards. Rather, it is natural to expect that the publicity attracts more
attention from arbitrageurs after the publication date as compared to before the publication date.
Arbitrageurs are therefore more likely to trade on it. We will empirically examine this prediction.
We also note that in the early 1990s, when the hedge fund industry grew rapidly and hence more
arbitrage capital are likely to start exploiting those anomalies. This is also consistent with our
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notion of discovery, which operates through the pricing effects of arbitrage capital. That is, the
discovery time for an anomaly is the time after which significantly more arbitrage capital starts
exploiting the anomaly.
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the anomalies. Among the 99 anomalies, 87% of
them (86) have a return with the absolute value of the t-statistic above 1.5. The average long-
short return of these anomalies are 70 bps per month. These results confirm that the anomaly
findings documented in their original studies. The average correlations between them is low (0.05),
consistent with other studies reporting a similar number (e.g., McLean and Pontiff (2016), Green,
Hand and Zhang (2017, GHZ)).10 Internet Appendix Table A.1 provides further details of the 99
individual anomalies.
We obtain the monthly hedge fund returns and assets under management (AUM) from TASS
for the period of 1981–2015.11 Since we examine anomalies in the U.S. equity market, we only
keep U.S. equity funds by using the filters used in prior studies (e.g., Chen, Han, and Pan 2017).
Then, we compute the percentage change in AUM for each fund and aggregate them into the
value-weighted average of percentage AUM change of all funds. For each month during 1986–
2015, hedge fund wealth volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of this aggregate AUM
percentage changes during the previous 5 years, excluding the current month t. The summary
statistics for hedge fund wealth volatility are reported in Table 2. This series has a mean of 0.08
and a standard deviation of 0.10.
To measure arbitrageurs’ trading activities, we construct two proxies. First, we utilize the clas-
sification in Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013) which combines the information in the 13F
institutional holdings data and hedge fund name information from a union of 5 major hedge fund
databases to identify the hedge funds in 13F. The 13F holdings data cover by far the largest num-
ber of institutional investors: all institutional investment managers (including foreign investors)
that have investment discretion over $100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities (mostly
publicly traded equity) are required to disclose their quarter-end holdings in these securities. A
13F-filing institution is classified as a hedge fund if its major business is sponsoring/managing
hedge funds according to the information revealed from a range of sources, including the institu-
tion’s own websites, SEC filings, industry directories and publications, and news article searches.
A Form 13F is filed at the “management company” rather than at the “portfolio” or at the indi-
1090% of the anomalies are based on published papers. Removing anomalies based on working papers do not
change the results of the paper.
111981 is the first year TASS has comprehensive TNA data.
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vidual fund level. We identify the hedge fund holdings for the period in which we have the hedge
fund AUM data. Our final sample consists of 942 unique hedge funds.
Second, we utilize the monthly short interest data for NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ stocks from
COMPUSTAT to proxy for arbitrageurs’ short positions. The short interest data for NASDAQ
stocks are available after 2000. We therefore focus on short selling after 2000. A stock’s short
interest in a month is the total number of uncovered shares sold short for transactions settled on
or before the 15th of the month, normalized by the total number of shares outstanding, which is
obtained from CRSP.
4.2 Correlation
Our model implies that the discovery of an anomaly reduces the correlation between the long and
short legs of the anomaly. To test this prediction, we examine whether the correlation coefficient
between the excess returns of deciles 1 and 10 decreases after the discovery of the anomaly.12
We estimate the monthly correlation coefficient between the excess returns from deciles 1 and
10 based on a 5-year rolling window of returns, including the current month. To formally test
whether the correlations decrease after discoveries, we adjust the correlations between deciles 1
and 10 by the correlations between deciles 5 and 6. For each anomaly i, we compute the excess
correlation as
Xi,t ≡ ρ
1,10
i,t − ρ
5,6
i,t , (16)
where ρ1,10i,t is the correlation coefficient between the monthly excess returns of deciles 1 and 10 of
anomaly i during the five years prior to month t, and ρ5,6i,t is similarly defined for deciles 5 and 6.
This adjustment controls for a potential time trend for the correlation among stocks. The
motivation is the following. To exploit the anomaly, arbitrageurs are likely to take larger long-
short positions in deciles 1 and 10 than in deciles 5 and 6. Hence, the correlation between deciles
5 and 6 may share a common time trend with the correlation between deciles 1 and 10, but should
be subject to a weaker discovery effect. As shown in Table 2, the excess correlation has a mean
of −0.10, and standard deviation of 0.14.
We regress the excess correlation Xi,t on Discoveryi,t, a dummy variable that takes the value
of 0 before the discovery of anomaly i and 1 afterwards. In all regressions, we control for anomaly
12Lou and Polk (2013) uses the high-frequency correlation among stocks to infer the size of arbitrage capital.
The economic mechanism is quite different. In their setup, higher correlations among stocks within Decile 10 (or
Decile 1) imply a larger arbitrage capital size. However, in our setup, higher low-frequency correlations between
decile 1 and 10 portfolios imply a smaller arbitrage capital size.
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fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by anomalies.13
The first column of Table 3 shows that the coefficient for the discovery dummy is −0.05, with
a t-statistic of −6.39. This suggests that the excess correlation decreases by 5% on average after
the discovery of an anomaly. This is a sizable reduction as it represents 36% of the standard
deviation of the correlation coefficient.
In the above regression, all anomalies are treated equally. However, one would expect that
some anomalies are more likely to attract the attention from arbitrageurs than others. As a proxy
for arbitrageurs’ attention to each anomaly, we obtain Google citation count, as of October 2016,
of the studies that first discovered the anomaly. Admittedly, this measure is likely to be quite
imprecise, and hence is likely to be biased against any statistical significance in our tests. Following
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006), we use weighted least square to estimate the discovery
effects, where the weights are based on the citation counts of the studies that discovered the
anomalies. As shown in column 3, the coefficient for the discovery dummy is −0.09 (t = −9.11),
representing 64% of the standard deviation of the correlation coefficient. That is, consistent with
our intuition, the discovery effect is much stronger when the anomaly publication is more widely
cited.
4.3 The role of arbitrageurs
In our model, the discovery effect operates through arbitrage trading: arbitrageurs’ trading ac-
tivity reduces the correlation between deciles 1 and 10. Hence, a direct test of this view is to
examine whether this correlation is indeed related to arbitrageurs’ activity.
Our model implies that the post-discovery correlation between deciles 1 and 10 of an anomaly
is decreasing in the volatility of arbitrageurs’ wealth. This prediction is the opposite of the
implication from the conventional intuition that arbitrageurs’ wealth tends to be more volatile
when the market is more volatile (e.g., in a financial crisis). Since stocks tend to be more correlated
when the market is more volatile, this conventional intuition implies that the correlation between
deciles 1 and 10 should be positively related to the volatility of arbitrageurs’ wealth.
To test our hypothesis, we need a proxy for the volatility of arbitrageurs’ wealth. It is certainly
impossible to directly observe the aggregate wealth of all arbitrageurs. As a compromise, we
measure the wealth of one group of investors, who are often considered to be arbitrageurs in
financial markets: hedge funds. The implicit assumption is that the volatility of the aggregate
13The results are also similar if we double-cluster standard errors by anomalies and time.
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wealth of all hedge funds is positively correlated with the volatility of the total wealth of all
arbitrageurs.
To test our hypothesis, we run a panel regression of the excess correlation Xt on the interaction
between the discovery dummy and hedge fund wealth volatility. To ease the interpretation of the
economic importance of the regression, we scaled the hedge fund wealth volatility by its standard
deviation. The normalized variable is denoted wealth volt. Our focus is the interaction term
Discovery × wealth volt. Our model implies that the hedge fund wealth volatility reduces the
correlation between deciles 1 and 10 after the discovery. That is, the coefficient for the interaction
term should be negative. This is indeed the case. Column 3 of Table 3 shows that the coefficient for
the interaction term is−0.05, with a t-statistic of −2.37. This means that a one standard deviation
increase in wealth volatility will result in 5% more reduction in correlation post discovery than
before discovery. This magnitude is again sizable and represents 36% of the standard deviation
of the correlation coefficient.
We also estimate the regression by citation-weighted least square. As shown in column 4,
consistent with the interpretation that the discovery effect is stronger for influential discoveries,
the coefficient for the interaction term Discovery × wealth volt become more than twice larger,
and is −0.13 (t = −3.00). That is, a one standard deviation increase in wealth volatility will
increase the discovery effect by 13%, which is 93% of the standard deviation of the correlation
coefficient.
In summary, our evidence so far is consistent with the model prediction that the discovery
of an anomaly reduces the correlation between the long and the short portfolios of the anomaly.
Moreover, this effect is stronger when the aggregate asset under management by hedge funds is
more volatile.
4.4 Diversification benefits
One economic consequence of this reduction in correlation is that it leads to diversification benefits
to passive investors who hold both deciles 1 and 10. Note that the set of stocks in deciles 1 and
10 of an anomaly change over time. Hence, the diversification benefits are effectively shared by
passive investors who hold the market portfolio.
In this section, we empirically examine this implication. Specifically, we estimate the volatility
of the portfolio of deciles 1 and 10 based on a 5-year rolling window of monthly returns, including
the current month. To control for the time trend in volatility in the market, we calculate the
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excess volatility as the volatility of deciles 1 and 10 over the volatility of the market portfolio,
which is estimated similarly based on a 5-year rolling window.
We then regress this excess volatility on the Discovery dummy variable, with anomaly fixed
effects. The first column of Table 4 shows that the coefficient for the discovery dummy is −0.007
with a t-statistic of −2.98 in the regression where anomalies are equal-weighted. The coeffi-
cient increases by almost three times to −0.02 with a t-statistic of -2.94 in the regression where
anomalies are citation-weighted. The reductions in volatility are economically important as they
represent 21% and 61% drop from the pre-discovery excess volatility (0.033) for the equal- and
citation-weighted results, respectively
To examine the role arbitrageurs in the effect on diversification benefits, we run a panel
regression of the excess volatility on the interaction term Discovery × wealth volt. As shown in
the column 3 of Table 4, the coefficient for the interaction term is −0.004 (t = −2.83). That
is, a one standard deviation increase in wealth volatility would result in 0.4% more reduction in
volatility, which represents a 12% drop from pre-discovery excess volatility. Finally, we also rerun
the regression using citation-weighted least square. As shown in column 4, the effect becomes
significantly stronger, both in economic magnitude and statistically. A one standard deviation
increase in wealth volatility would result in 0.6% more reduction in volatility, representing a 18%
drop from the pre-discovery excess volatility.
4.5 Arbitrage Trading
In this section, we directly examine the model implications on arbitrage trading. As in the
previous section, we infer arbitrage trading from hedge fund holdings. Specifically, we compute
the aggregate hedge fund purchase of each stock as the quarterly percentage change in their
aggregate holdings in the stock. Then, for each anomaly, we use the average hedge fund purchase
of decile 1 stocks minus that of decile 10 stocks as a proxy for arbitrageurs’ trading on the
anomaly. A positive value of this measure is consistent with arbitrageurs trading in the “right”
direction to exploit the anomaly, while a negative value is consistent with them trading in the
“wrong” direction. Table 2 shows that the average of our trading measure in the entire sample is
insignificantly different from zero.
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4.5.1 Discovery and Arbitrage Trading
To exploit an anomaly, arbitrageurs establish a long position in decile 1 and short position in
decile 10. As the stocks in deciles 1 and 10 change over time, arbitrageurs need to re-balance
their positions. That is, after the discovery of an anomaly, our arbitrageurs’ trading measure
should be sustained at a higher level. To test this prediction, we run a panel regression of our
anomaly trading measure on the discovery dummy, with two lags of this trading measure as the
control for its serial correlation. Consistent with the prediction, as shown in column 1 of Table 5,
the coefficient of Discovery is 0.02 (t = 2.06). That is, on average, the discovery of an anomaly
is accompanied with an increase in hedge funds’ anomaly trading equivalent to 2% of the total
shares outstanding of the traded stocks. As shown in column 2, when we estimate the regression
by citation-weighted least square, the effect is more than 3 times as large: the coefficient of
Discovery is 0.07 (t = 7.58). Therefore, the results suggest that discovery is accompanied with
economically and statistically significant increase in hedge fund trading that exploits the anomaly.
The literature so far has been inconclusive on whether arbitrageurs exploit anomalies in the
right direction. Ali, Chen, Yao, and Yu (2008) find that mutual funds in aggregate do not trade
on the accrual anomaly. Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec (2016) shows that institutional investors trade
7 anomalies in the “wrong” direction on average. Calluzzo, Moneta, and Topaloglu (2017) shows
the opposite results to Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec (2016) using 14 anomalies, particularly after
anomalies’ publication dates. In contrast, our evidence is based on a much more comprehensive
set of anomalies. More importantly, we also further examine, in the next section, arbitrageurs’
trading after wealth shocks, a main mechanism in our model.
4.5.2 Wealth Change and Arbitrage Trading
Our model suggests that after the discovery of an anomaly, arbitrage trading on the anomaly
intensifies (reverses), when arbitrageurs’ wealth increases (decreases). To test this, we run a
panel regression of our anomaly trading measure on the interaction term of the discovery dummy
and the lagged change in hedge fund wealth (scaled by the standard deviation of wealth change).
Consistent with our prediction, as shown in column 3 of Table 5, the coefficient of the interaction
term is 0.02 (t = 2.81). That is, after the discovery of an anomaly, a one standard deviation
increase (decrease) in the aggregate asset under management by hedge funds leads to an increase
(decrease) in their positions that exploit the anomaly by around 2% of the total shares outstanding
of the stocks traded. We also run the citation-weighted least square regression, and, as shown
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in the last column, although the point estimate of the interaction coefficient remains similar, its
t-statistic increases to 5.97. This evidence supports our model implication that after the discovery
of an anomaly, arbitrageurs actively adjust their positions over time to exploit the anomaly.
4.5.3 Arbitrage Trading Inferred from Short Selling
To complement the above analysis based on hedge fund holdings in long positions, we construct
an alternative arbitrage trading measure from short selling activities. Short interest includes all
short positions and is not necessarily initiated by hedge funds. But given that mutual funds and
pension funds are generally not allowed to short, the bulk of short positions are likely from hedge
funds.
Specifically, for each anomaly, we compute the average of the change in short interest of decile-
1 stocks and that of decile-10 stocks. The anomaly trading measure is the change in short interest
of decile 10 minus that of decile 1. Hence, a positive value of this measure is consistent with
arbitrageurs trading in the “right” direction to exploit the anomaly, while a negative value is
consistent with them trading in the “wrong” direction.
We rerun the same panel regressions as in Table 5 using the short selling-based anomaly
trading measure at the monthly frequency. As shown in column 1 of Table 6, the coefficient
on the discovery dummy term is 0.04 (t = 2.15). That is, after the discovery of an anomaly,
arbitrageurs increase their short selling in the direction of exploiting the anomaly by 4% of the
shares outstanding. On citation-weighted basis, the estimate of the coefficient is 0.04 (t = 3.94).
Similarly, we regress the short selling-based anomaly trading measure on the interaction term
of the discovery dummy and the lagged change in hedge fund wealth scaled by the standard
deviation of the wealth change. As shown in column 3, the coefficient of the interaction term is
0.03 (t = 2.28). That is, a one standard deviation increase (decrease) in the aggregate asset under
management by hedge funds leads to 3% more (less) short interest in the direction of exploiting the
anomaly in the post-discovery period. On the citation-weighted basis, the effect is even stronger.
The estimate of the interaction coefficient is 0.07 (t = 3.36).
In summary, the evidence in this section further supports the arbitrage trading implications
in our model. That is, after the discovery of an anomaly, arbitrageurs trade more to the direction
of exploiting the anomaly. They also adjust their positions over time, establishing more positions
to exploit the anomaly when their wealth increases, but unwind their positions when their wealth
decreases.
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5 Conclusion
We have analyzed a stylized model of anomaly discovery, which has implications for both asset
prices and arbitrageurs’ trading. Our model shows that consistent with existing evidence, the
discovery of an anomaly reduces its magnitude and makes its returns more correlated with the
returns from existing anomalies. Moreover, our model shows that the discovery of an anomaly
reduces the correlation between the two extreme portfolios formed from the corresponding port-
folio sorting for that anomaly, and that this effect is stronger when arbitrageurs’ wealth is more
volatile. One economic consequence of this reduction in correlation is that it leads to diversi-
fication benefits for passive investors who hold the market portfolio. We empirically test these
new predictions for 99 anomalies, and find clear evidence consistent with our model predictions.
Moreover, we also directly examine arbitrageurs’ trading behavior. Consistent with our model
predictions, we find that after the discovery of an anomaly, arbitrageurs increase (reverse) their
positions in exploiting the anomaly when their wealth increases (decreases), further supporting
the view that the discovery effects work through arbitrage trading.
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Appendix A. Numerical procedure
We follow the procedure described below to solve the model:
1. Take initial guesses for the total wealth for investors and arbitrageurs at t = 1: W1 and W
a
1
for the eight states at date 1.
2. For each of the eight states, take W1 and W
a
1 as given, solve for the portfolios (θi,1 for
i = 1, 2, and θai,1 for i = 1, 2, e) and prices P1,1 and P2,1.
3. Take the prices P1,1 and P2,1 for the eight states in step 2 as given, solve for the t = 0
portfolios (θi,0 for i = 1, 2, and θ
a
i,0 for i = 1, 2, e) and prices P1,0 and P2,0.
4. Based on the portfolios in step 3 (θi,0 for i = 1, 2, and θ
a
i,0 for i = 1, 2, e) and the prices in
steps 2 and 3 (P1,0, P2,0, and P1,1, P2,1 for all eight states at t = 1), calculate the investors’
and arbitrageurs’ updated wealth, W1 and W
a
1 , in the eight cases at t = 1.
5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 until the wealth, portfolios, and prices converge, i.e., for each variable,
the difference between two iterations is no greater than 0.00005.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Due to the logarithmic preference, the maximization problem (4) is equivalent to maximizing the
log wealth growth for each period. Hence, investors’ first-order conditions are given by
Et
[
ri,t+1 − 1
Wt+1 + ρP1,t+1
]
= 0,
for i = 1, 2, t = 0, 1. Similarly, the arbitrageurs’ optimization problem (7) can also be decomposed
into a period-by-period optimization problem, and the first-order conditions are given by
Et
[
r1,t+1 − r2,t+1
W at+1
]
= 0,
Et
[
ra,t+1 − 1
W at+1
]
= 0.
Combining the above first-order conditions with the market-clearing conditions, we can charac-
terize the equilibria in Propositions 1 and 2.
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We now prove P1,0 < P2,0 by contradiction. Suppose P1,0 ≥ P2,0. Note that investors’ optimal
portfolio in equilibrium is to hold one unit of both assets. Suppose an investor sells ǫ unit of asset
1 and buys ǫ unit of asset 2. Define his expected utility as
U(ǫ) ≡ E0[log(k + (1 + ρ− ǫ)D1 + (1 + ǫ)D2)].
It is easy to see that dU
dǫ
|ǫ=0 > 0. That is, he can strictly improve his portfolio by selling ǫ unit of
asset 1 and buying ǫ unit of asset 2. This leads to a contradiction.
Proof of Propositions 3
The first-order condition to the maximization problem (12) is given by (13). The first-order
conditions for arbitrageurs are still given by (14) and (15). These optimality and market-clearing
conditions lead to the results in the proposition.
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Figure 1: Anomaly Return
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Panels A–C plot the expected anomaly return, E[r1,1 − r2,1], on arbitrageurs’ initial wealth W
a
0 ,
asset e’s expected return µe and volatility σe, respectively. The parameter values are given by
Table 1.
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Figure 2: Correlation Among Anomaly Returns
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Panels A–C plot the correlation coefficient between the anomaly return and asset e’s return,
Corr(r1,1 − r2,1, re,1), on arbitrageurs’ initial wealth W
a
0 , asset e’s expected return µe, and its
volatility σe, respectively. The parameter values are given by Table 1.
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Figure 3: Correlation Between Assets 1 and 2
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Panels A and B plot the correlation coefficient between assets 1 and 2, Corr(r1,1, r2,1), on ar-
bitrageurs’ initial wealth W a0 , and their wealth volatility σ
a, respectively. Arbitrageurs’ wealth
volatility σa is an endogenous variable. We generate its variation by varying µe from 1.1 to 1.46.
All other parameter values are given by Table 1.
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Figure 4: Diversification Benefits
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Panels A and B plot the volatility of the portfolio of Assets 1 and 2, V ol(r1,1+ r2,1), against arbi-
trageurs’ initial wealth W a0 , and wealth volatility σ
a respectively. Arbitrageurs’ wealth volatility
σa is an endogenous variable. We generate its variation by varying µe from 1.1 to 1.46. All other
parameter values are given by Table 1.
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Figure 5: Comparison: Asset Prices
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Panels A–C plot the expected anomaly return, E[r1,1 − r2,1], its correlation with asset e’s return,
Corr(r1,1−r2,1, re,1), and the correlation between assets 1 and 2, Corr(r1,1, r2,1), on arbitrageurs’
initial wealth W a0 , respectively. The solid line is for the risk-based case, and the dashed line the
mispricing-based case. Parameter values: b = 0.055, and other parameter values are given by
Table 1. 37
Table 1: Baseline Parameterizations
This table reports the baseline parameter values in our numerical analysis.
Parameter W a0 k ρ µ σ p µe σe pe
Value 1 1 1 1.2 0.6 0.5 1.4 0.5 0.5
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Number of Anomalies 99
Number of Anomalies with t-statistic>1.5 86
Average Correlation among Anomalies 0.05
Mean Publication Year of the Anomalies 2000
Median Publication Year of the Anomalies 2001
Percentage of Anomalies based on Working Paper 10%
Mean Long-Short Monthly Anomaly Return 0.70%
Mean Xi,t -0.10
Std Xi,t 0.14
Mean Hedge Fund Wealth Volatility 0.08
Std Hedge Fund Wealth Volatility 0.10
Mean Anomaly Trading -0.15%
Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics. Mean Xi,t and Std Xi,t are the mean and standard deviation of
the excess correlation, where the excess correlation Xi,t is defined in (16). Mean hedge fund wealth
volatility and Std hedge fund wealth volatility are the mean and standard deviation of the hedge fund
wealth volatility. Hedge fund wealth volatility is the standard deviation of the monthly percentage
changes in the assets under management by all U.S.-equity-focused hedge funds, and is estimated based
on a rolling window of the previous 5 years. Mean Anomaly Trading is the average Anomaly Trading
across all anomalies and all quarters. For each anomaly and each quarter, the Anomaly Trading is the
average hedge fund purchase of decile 1 stocks minus that of decile 10 stocks.  
Dependant Variable
Wealth_vol (t) 0.03*** -0.0096
(7.01) (-1.27)
Discovery × Wealth_vol (t) -0.05** -0.13***
(-2.37) (-3.00)
Discovery -0.05*** -0.09*** 0.01 -0.063**
(-6.39) (-9.11) (1.56) (-2.05)
Anomaly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 59,358 59,358 31,469 31,469
R2 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.18
This table reports the results from the panel regressions of the excess correlation Xi,t, which is defined
in (16), on the dummy variable Discovery, which is 0 before the discovery time and 1 afterwards,
Wealth_vol (t), which is the hedge fund wealth volatility normalized by its standard deviation, and the
interaction term. Hedge fund wealth volatility is the standard deviation of the monthly percentage
changes in the assets under management by all U.S.-equity-focused hedge funds, and is estimated
based on a rolling window of the previous 5 years. The regressions are either equal-weighted or
citation-weighted, and include anomaly fixed effects. The citation counts of an anomaly are its Google
citation counts as of October 2016. Constant terms are omitted. T-statistics are reported in the
parenthesis, and are based on standard errors that are clustered by anomaly. *, **, and *** indicate
that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 3: Discovery and Correlation
Equal- 
Weighted
Citation-
Weighted
Equal- 
Weighted
Citation-
Weighted
Correlation (i,t)
Dependant Variable
Wealth_vol (t) -0.001*** 0.001***
(-4.21) (4.57)
Discovery × Wealth_vol (t) -0.004*** -0.006***
(-2.83) (-8.75)
Discovery -0.007*** -0.02*** 0.002 -0.005
(-2.98) (-2.94) (1.11) (-0.66)
Anomaly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 59,358 59,358 32,240 32,240
R2 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.05
This table reports the results from the panel regressions. The dependent variable is Excess Volatility (i,t),
which is the standard deviation, in month t, of monthly returns of the portfolio of deciles 1 and 10 of
anomaly i minus the standard deviation of monthly market retunrs. The estimation is based on a rolling
window of the previous 5 year data. The independent variables include the dummy variable Discovery,
which is 0 before the discovery time and 1 afterwards, Wealth_vol (t), which is the hedge fund wealth
volatility normalized by its standard deviation, and the interaction term. Hedge fund wealth volatility is
the standard deviation of the monthly percentage changes in the assets under management by all U.S.-
equity-focused hedge funds, and is estimated based on a rolling window of the previous 5 years. The
regressions are either equal-weighted or citation-weighted, and include anomaly fixed effects. The citation
counts of an anomaly are its Google citation counts as of October 2016. Constant terms are omitted. T-
statistics are reported in the parenthesis, and are based on standard errors that are clustered by anomaly.
*, **, and *** indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Table 4: Discovery and Diversification Benefits
Equal- 
Weighted
Citation-
Weighted
Equal- 
Weighted
Citation-
Weighted
Excess Volatility (i,t)
Dependant Variable
Chwealth (q-1) 0.00 0.01
(0.15) (1.46)
Discovery × Chwealth (q-1) 0.02*** 0.02***
(2.81) (5.97)
Discovery 0.02** 0.07*** 0.02* 0.06***
(2.06) (7.58) (1.97) (5.12)
Anomaly Trading (i,q-1) -0.17*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.22***
(-8.09) (-2.75) (-8.09) (-2.73)
Anomaly Trading (i,q-2) -0.14*** -0.27*** -0.14*** -0.27***
(-5.18) (-10.23) (-5.20) (-10.20)
Anomaly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12606 12606 12420 12420
R2 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.07
Equal- 
Weighted
Citation-
Weighted
Table 5: Discovery and Aribtrage Trading: Long Positions
This table reports the results from the panel regressions. The dependent variable is Anomaly Trading (i,q),
which is the average hedge fund purchase of decile 1 stocks minus that of decile 10 stocks of anomaly i in
quarter q. The independent variables include the dummy variable Discovery, which is 0 before the
discovery time and 1 afterwards, Chwealth (q-1), which is the change of the aggregate asset under
management of all the U.S.-equity-focused hedge funds in quarter q-1 normalized by its standard
deviation, and the interaction term. The regressions are either equal-weighted or citation-weighted, and
include anomaly fixed effects. The citation counts of an anomaly are its Google citation counts as of
October 2016. Constant terms are omitted. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis, and are based on
standard errors that are clustered by anomaly. *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficients are statistically
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Anomaly Trading (i,q)
Equal- 
Weighted
Citation-
Weighted
Dependant Variable
Chwealth (m-1) -0.00 -0.01*
(-0.38) (-1.78)
Discovery × Chwealth (m-1) 0.03** 0.07***
(2.28) (3.36)
Discovery 0.04** 0.04*** 0.05** 0.04***
(2.15) (3.94) (2.56) (3.65)
Anomaly Trading (i,m-1) 0.55*** 0.64*** 0.54*** 0.62***
(11.81) (11.83) (13.05) (11.28)
Anomaly Trading (i,m-2) -0.04 -0.08*** -0.03 -0.07***
(-1.48) (-3.24) (-1.21) (-2.78)
Anomaly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,791 9,791 9,791 9,791
R2 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.36
Equal- 
Weighted
Citation-
Weighted
Table 6: Discovery and Aribtrage Trading: Short Positions
This table reports the results from the panel regressions. The dependent variable is Anomaly Trading (i,m),
which is the average change in short interests of decile 10 stocks minus that of decile 1 stocks of anomaly i
in month m. The independent variables include the dummy variable Discovery, which is 0 before the
discovery time and 1 afterwards, Chwealth (m-1), which is the change of the aggregate asset under
management of all the U.S. equity-focused hedge funds in month m-1 normalized by its standard deviation,
and the interaction term. The regressions are either equal-weighted or citation-weighted, and include
anomaly fixed effects. The citation counts of an anomaly are its Google citation counts as of October 2016.
Constant terms are omitted. T-statistics are reported in the parenthesis, and are based on standard errors
that are clustered by anomaly. *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Equal- 
Weighted
Citation-
Weighted
Anomaly Trading (i,m)
No. Anomaly Name Author(s) Date, Journal
1 Beta Fama & MacBeth 1973, JPE
2 Beta squared Fama & MacBeth 1973, JPE
3 Earnings-to-price Basu 1977, JF
4 O-score Ohlson 1980, JAR
5 Dividends-to-price Litzenberger & Ramaswamy 1982, JF
6 Unexpected quarterly earnings Rendelman, Jones & Latane 1982, JFE
7 Change in forecasted annual EPS Hawkins, Chamberlin & 
Daniel
1984, FAJ
8 36-month Reversal De Bondt & Thaler 1985, JF
9 Forecasted growth in 5-year EPS Bauman & Dowen 1988, FAJ
10 Leverage Bhandari 1988, JF
11 % change in current ratio Ou & Penman 1989, JAE
12 % change in quick ratio Ou & Penman 1989, JAE
13 % change in sales-to-inventory Ou & Penman 1989, JAE
14 Cash flow-to-debt Ou & Penman 1989, JAE
15 Current ratio Ou & Penman 1989, JAE
16 Quick ratio Ou & Penman 1989, JAE
17 Sales-to-cash Ou & Penman 1989, JAE
18 Sales-to-inventory Ou & Penman 1989, JAE
19 Sales-to-receivables Ou & Penman 1989, JAE
20 Amihud illiquidity Amihud & Mendelson 1989, JF
21 Bid-ask spread Amihud & Mendelson 1989, JF
22 12-month momentum Jegadeesh 1990, JF
23 1-month reversal Jegadeesh 1990, JF
24 6-month momentum Jegadeesh & Titman 1990, JF
25 Net stock issue Ritter 1991, JF
26 % change in depreciation-to-gross PP&E Holthausen & Larcker 1992, JAE
27 Depreciation-to-gross PP&E Holthausen & Larcker 1992, JAE
28 Book-to-market Fama and French 1992, JF
29 Size (market cap) Fama and French 1992, JF
30 Annual sales growth Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny 1994, JF
31 Industry-adjusted change in employees Asness, Porter & Stevens 1994, WP
32 New equity issue Loughran, Ritter & Ritter 1995, JF
33 Sales-to-price Barbee, Mukherji & Raines 1996, FAJ
34 Working capital accruals Sloan 1996, TAR
35 Share turnover Datar, Naik & Radcliffe 1998, JFM
36 % change in CAPEX - industry % change in 
CAPEX
Abarbanell & Bushee 1998, TAR
This table provides the name, author, publication information of the 99 anomalies used in our paper.
Notation: FAJ=Financial Analysts Journal; JAE= Journal of Accounting and Economics; JAR=Journal
of Accounting Review; JBFA=Journal of Business, Finance & Accounting; JF=Journal of Finance;
JEF=Journal of Empirical Finance; JFE=Journal of Financial Economics; JFM=Journal of Financial
Markets; JFQA=Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis; JPE=Journal of Political Economy;
RAS=Review of Accounting Studies; TAR=The Accounting Review; WP=Working Paper.
Table A.1 Anomalies
37 % change in gross margin - % change in sales Abarbanell & Bushee 1998, TAR
38 % change in sales - % change in accounts 
receivable
Abarbanell & Bushee 1998, TAR
39 % change in sales - % change in inventory Abarbanell & Bushee 1998, TAR
40 % change in sales - % change in SG&A Abarbanell & Bushee 1998, TAR
41 # of consecutive earnings increases Barth, Elliott & Finn 1999, JAR
42 Industry momentum Moskowitz & Grinblatt 1999, JF
43 Financial statements score Piotroski 2000, JAR
44 Industry-adjusted book-to-market Asness, Porter & Stevens 2000, WP
45 Industry-adjusted cash flow-to-price ratio Asness, Porter & Stevens 2000, WP
46 Industry-adjusted firm size Asness, Porter & Stevens 2000, WP
47 Abnormal volume Gervais, Kaniel, Mingelgrin 2001, JF
48 Dollar trading volume in month t-2 Chordia, Subrahmanyam & 
Anshuman
2001, JFE
49 Volatility of dollar trading volume Chordia, Subrahmanyam & 
Anshuman
2001, JFE
50 Volatility of share turnover Chordia, Subrahmanyam & 
Anshuman
2001, JFE
51 # of analysts covering stock Elgers, Lo & Pfeiffer 2001, TAR
52 Scaled analyst forecast of one year ahead 
earnings
Elgers, Lo & Pfeiffer 2001, TAR
53 Dispersion in forecasted eps Diether, Malloy & Scherbina 2002, JF
54 Changes in inventory Thomas & Zhang 2002, RAS
55 Idiosyncratic return volatility Ali, Hwang & Trombley 2003, JFE
56 Growth in long term net operating assets Fairfield, Whisenant & Yohn 2003, TAR
57 Net operating assets Hirshleifer et. al. 2004, JAE
58 RD_increase Eberhart, Maxwell & Siddique 2004, JF
59 Investment to assets Titman, Wei & Xie 2004, JFQA
60 Cash flow-to-price Desai, Rajgopal & 
Venkatachalam
2004, TAR
61 Earnings volatility Francis, LaFond, Olsson & 
Schipper
2004, TAR
62 Taxable income to book income Lev & Nissim 2004, TAR
63 Change in common shareholder equity Richardson, Sloan, Soliman & 
Tuna
2005, JAE
64 Change in long-term debt Richardson, Sloan, Soliman & 
Tuna
2005, JAE
65 # of years since first Compustat coverage Jiang, Lee & Zhang 2005, RAS
66 Financial statements score Mohanram 2005, RAS
67 Price delay Hou & Moskowitz 2005, RFS
68 R&D-to-market cap Guo, Lev & Shi 2006, JBFA
69 R&D-to-sales Guo, Lev & Shi 2006, JBFA
70 % change over two years in CAPEX Anderson & Garcia-Feijoo 2006, JF
71 Composite equity issue Daniel and Titman 2006, JF
72 Industry sales concentration Hou & Robinson 2006, JF
73 Return volatility Ang, Hodrick, Xing & Zhang 2006, JF
74 Return on assets Fama and French 2006, JFE
75 Zero-trading days Liu 2006, JFE
76 Abnormal volume in earnings announcement 
month
Lerman, Livnat & Mendenhall 2007, WP
77 Change in # analysts Scherbina 2007, WP
78 Return on invested capital Brown & Rowe 2007, WP
79 Asset growth Cooper, Gulen & Schill 2008, JF
80 Financial distress Campbell, et. al. 2008, JF
81 Industry-adjusted change in asset turnover Soliman 2008, TAR
82 Industry-adjusted change in profit margin Soliman 2008, TAR
83 3-day return around earnings announcement Brandt, Kishore, Santa-Clara 
& Venkatachalam
2008, WP
84 Revenue surprise Kama 2009, JBFA
85 Cash flow volatility Huang 2009, JEF
86 Debt capacity-to-firm tangibility Hahn & Lee 2009, JF
87 Cash productivity Chandrashekar & Rao 2009, WP
88 Employee growth rate Bazdresch, Belo & Lin 2009, WP
89 Real estate holdings Tuzel 2010, RFS
90 Absolute accruals Bandyopadhyay, Huang & 
Wirjanto
2010, WP
91 Accrual volatility Bandyopadhyay, Huang & 
Wirjanto
2010, WP
92 Change in tax expense Thomas & Zhang 2011, JAR
93 Maximum daily return in prior month Bali, Cakici & Whitelaw 2011, JFE
94 Percent accruals Hafzalla, Lundholm & Van 
Winkle
2011, TAR
95 Cash holdings Palazzo 2012, JFE
96 Organizational capital Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou 2013, JF
97 Asset Turnover Novy-Marx 2013, JFE
98 Gross profitability Novy-Marx 2013, JFE
99 Secured debt-to-total debt Valta 2015, JFQA
